

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

The International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/usip20

Fearing the Eye in the Sky: *How the Fear of Espionage Affected the Development of Civil Aviation during the Cold War*

Karl Lorentz Kleve

To cite this article: Karl Lorentz Kleve (2020) Fearing the Eye in the Sky: *How the Fear of Espionage Affected the Development of Civil Aviation during the Cold War*, The International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs, 22:3, 307-327, DOI: 10.1080/23800992.2020.1839725

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/23800992.2020.1839725

© 2020 The Author(s). Published with license by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.

Published online: 02 Nov 2020.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 1063

View related articles

View Crossmark data

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=usip20

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE, SECURITY, AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS
2020, VOL. 22, NO. 3, 307–327
https://doi.org/10.1080/23800992.2020.1839725

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

OPEN ACCESS
Check for updates

Fearing the Eye in the Sky: *How the Fear of Espionage Affected the Development of Civil Aviation during the Cold War*

Karl Lorentz Kleve

Norwegian National Aviation Museum, Bodø, Norway

ABSTRACT
This article will discuss the role of espionage as a limiting factor in the development of international civil aviation in the Cold War. Previous research into the international aviation regime has focused on the fear of losing control of sovereignty as a primary limiting factor. But the focus has commonly been on relations between Western nations. This article claim that fear of espionage has also been of considerable importance in reducing aviation's potential for free and easy access, primarily across the Iron Curtain. The study focuses on Norwegian-Soviet aviation relations as a case study.

ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 26 June 2020
Revised 9 October 2020
Accepted 15 October 2020

KEYWORDS
Aviation; international aviation regime; aerial espionage; cold war

Introduction

The potential for fast and easy travel between all corners of the globe has captivated aviation enthusiasts since the invention of flight. But to take advantage of an airspace free of physical obstacles, one must first consider that Earth is not a united entity. All its independent states have absolute sovereignty over their own airspace. An airline wanting to set up air routes and transport goods and people needs permission from all the states its routes touches. The airlines cannot obtain these permissions directly. The modern system of international relations is built upon negotiated agreements between independent states (Kleve, 2019).

Although several attempts to create multinational agreements on aviation have been made through history, direct negotiations and bilateral agreements between states have never been replaced. In all negotiations on aviation agreements, and in most discussions of international aviation, an overarching issue has been to which extent aviation should be controlled and regulated.

The objective of this study is to present one aspect which in my opinion limited the development of international aviation: The fear of espionage. I would argue that the Cold War has been a significant and understudied limiting factor. Through a focus on the development of relations between Western European and North American states, countries which for most of

CONTACT Karl Lorentz Kleve klk@luftfartsmuseum.no Norwegian National Aviation Museum, Norway.

© 2020 The Author(s). Published with license by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.

civil aviation's history have held shared positions on national security and have been closely allied, I believe existing studies on international aviation have unintentionally downplayed potential areas of conflict. By turning the perspective toward relations between West and East, I will attempt to offer a new perspective on bilateral aviation relations: How the Cold War conflict made the fear of aerial espionage a significant factor. My core argument will be that the potential for espionage inherent in civil aviation played a considerable role in limiting international aviation across the Iron Curtain. Limiting not only aviation between East and West, but even more importantly reduced the airlines access to airspace for routes to third countries like the Far East or Cuba.

This study looks primarily at aviation relations between Norway and the Soviet Union and its satellites as a case study. There are both practical and analytical arguments for this delimitation:

None of the existing major works on the international aviation regime have attempted to study the implications of the fear of espionage. This article is the first attempt. Norwegian-Soviet/Russian relationship in aviation is also a particularly fruitful study. The two countries have bordered each other for a long time, the only Cold War-border between a Nato-country and the Soviet Union.[1] Norway have also long had a special relationship with the Anglo–Saxon countries, leaders of the Atlantic alliance against the Soviet Union and especially skeptical toward Soviet intentions and generally fearful of Soviet espionage. At the same time, Norway has always wanted to maintain a calm, non-hostile relationship to the Soviet Union. From the dreams of linking USA and the Soviet Union through aviation in the late 1930s, via attempts at creating a neutral Scandinavian defense pact in the late 1940s, to the self-imposed restrictions on Nato-presence from the 1960s onward (Eriksen & Pharo, 1997).

Perspectives, method's and previous studies

Far from being free, the growing international civil aviation quickly developed into what Marc Dierikx has described as "a restrictive international regime under which everything was forbidden, unless express previous agreement had been reached between governments." (Dierikx, 2008, loc, p. 749). Alan Dobson claims that the fear of aerial bombing, a legacy of World War I, was an important counterpart at least in the 1920s, when talks between states and airlines about international aviation started, to the principle of free and unlimited access to airspace. But commercial civil aviation is mostly a thing of the post-WWII-era, the Cold War and after. Then, states fear of losing control of their own airspace have been a more important opposition to letting the airspace become free, according to Dierikx, Dobson and the other studies which have been made (Dobson, 2017, p. 12–13; Haanappel, 1978, p. 9–15;

Dierikx, 2008, loc 720–759). Loss of national sovereignty is a slippery slope which most nations were anxious to avoid. Thus, the principle of states right to their own airspace has in most literature on the international aviation regime been stated as the main opposition to freedom in the air throughout the relatively short history of civil aviation.

I would introduce the fear of espionage, or rather the fear that civil aviation could be used for espionage purposes, as another opposing viewpoint to freedom of the air. Rivaling control of airspace in importance as an argument for control, for decision-makers in circumstances primarily related to air routes between and crossing the opposing sides of the Cold War.

Of those who first and foremost saw the endless opportunities for free and unfettered aviation and international negotiations as a framework for securing substantial and wide-reaching agreements, dominant proponents would typically be commercial interests like the airline Det Norske Luftfartsselskap (The Norwegian Aviation Company DNL) who in 1938 envisaged a near future where Norway could be the hub in transglobal air routes connecting the USA and the Soviet Union.[2]

Opposing this would be political strategists first and foremost focused on upholding national control of the airspace. This is at least what Dobson, Dierikx and Peter Haanappel have found. But I will attempt to introduce the fear of espionage as a second position on this side.

Studies of the development of the international aviation regime is surprisingly sparse. I have only been able to locate a few historical studies, by historians Alan Dobson and Marc Dierikx, and aviation jurist Peter Haanappel, in addition to several older, more descriptive texts (See among others Bartlik, 2007; Lian, 1989; Nerdrum, 1986; Rosenberg, 1970; Tjomsland & Wilsberg, 1995). Of these three, Dobson covers the entire era of civil aviation, while Dierikx and Haanappel studies the postwar period. They all present international civil aviation in the duality of open skies versus control, and they agree on the national sovereignty over airspace as the main argument on the control-side.

Modern civil international aviation was formed at the Chicago Convention in 1944 where 54 nations participated, and the following bilateral Bermuda Agreement of 1946 between the two dominant airpowers in the aftermath of World War Two: USA and the UK. These two events cemented states' rights over their own airspace, even though both major airpowers the US and UK entered the negotiations with somewhat other positions. According to both Dierikx, Dobson and Haanappel, the US was at this point firmly in the open skies-position, relying on its huge economic and technological dominance (Dobson, 2017, p. 41–49; Haanappel, 1978, p. 10–15; Dierikx, 2008, loc 721–740). While the UK advocated what Dierikx called a form of "supranationality": That international aviation should be controlled by an international agency which could secure all nations a fair share of air traffic (Dierikx, 2008,

loc 721–731). Haanappel also points to Britain's need to protect its own war-ruined aviation from the overwhelming economic power of US aviation at this time.

The Soviet Union did not want to sign the Chicago Convention, due to a general distrust of the West (Dobson, 2017, p. 48).[3] And as such, the enormous and strategic territory of the Eastern Bloc was not covered by the agreements of Chicago. Dobson and Haanaapel do not attempt to study aviation relations across the Iron Curtain, or to see international aviation in a Cold War perspective. Dobson acknowledges the exclusion of the Soviet Union in his study but claims that the country is of little interest to him since it played such a small role in influencing the international aviation market (Dobson, 2017, p. 58).[4]

All other works which describe events at Chicago and Bermuda, and the international system of aviation, share Dobson's and Haanappel's somewhat narrow focus on Western Europe and North America. As I mentioned in the introduction, I think this focus on nations which share many political and cultural traits and are closely allied, artificially reduce the level of tension in international aviation.

Marc Dierikx is the only one attempting a more holistic approach, in that he attempts to see the footprint of aviation in other parts of society, and vice versa. He introduces the Soviet Union and its East European satellites, and mentions the fear of espionage briefly, but fails to follow up on his observations regarding East-West relations and does not attempt to study the development of aviation agreements across the Iron Curtain (Dierikx, 2008, loc 760–780).[5]

British intelligence historian Michael Herman claimed that the Cold War was all about espionage, when it was not about the fear of actual war. In fact, he claims that the fear of espionage is a particular component of the Cold War (Herman & Hughes, 2013. See also Riste & Moland, 1997). Western intelligence tried to fly dedicated airplanes – spyplanes into Soviet airspace many times. But to use intelligence planes in attempts to cross into Soviet airspace was dangerous.[6]

Herman mentions airplanes only briefly, and civil aviation not at all. But his views on the importance of intelligence in the Cold War is useful to substantiate my argument on the role of espionage in aviation. There is intelligence that only airplanes can gather,[7] and only civil aircraft on regular air routes or charter flights would have the potential for regular access to Soviet airspace. And vice versa for Soviet civil aircraft in Western airspaces.

Using an East-West rather than purely Western perspective would therefore seem to complement and add new insight to the dominant narrative on the international aviation regime. This was also helped by a recent study by Dutch journalist Dick van der Aart, on the Soviet use of the Aeroflot airline as a vehicle for intelligence gathering (Aart, 2018).

In addition to drawing on the mentioned literature, the main method used in this study is documentary analysis. I believe a close-reading of primary sources on individual cases provides useful insights into more general trends. My perspective is primarily Norwegian: Norwegian positions and Soviet positions as they are perceived in Norwegian sources, with a few prominent exceptions mentioned in the text.

A general lack of easily available sources may explain the absence of a more East-West-approach in other works on aviation.[8] The sources used here, are primarily composed of internal government letters, minutes and memoranda, internal SAS-reports of a descriptive nature and some Nato-minutes. I can discern little to no open bias in these types of sources.

The fear of espionage in Norwegian-Soviet aviation-relations: an analysis

With its vast size and strategic location, access to Soviet airspace was a prize vied for by many Western airlines.

In 1938, when civil aviation in Norway had barely started, DNL struck a deal with British Imperial Airways and Irish Rianta on a transatlantic route to the US from the brand new Sola Airport outside Stavanger, via Shannon in Ireland. DNL envisioned future possibilities for a trans-global route linking the United States and the Soviet Union via Norway.[9]

No attempts to realize these visions were made before the war, but the Norwegian ambassador in Moscow did approach the head of the Scandinavian Desk in the Soviet Foreign Office, Mr. Sergejev in 1944 about the possibility of establishing air routes between the two countries after the war was won.[10] The Soviets were then friendly and agreed that air routes between two such close war comrades as Norway and the Soviet Union would be quite natural. Much more natural than routes to f.ex. Sweden, since Sweden lacked this bond to the Soviet Union created by a common war experience, as Mr. Sergejev declared, according to the Norwegian ambassador in his report back to the Norwegian government in exile in London.[11]

First attempt to negotiate an agreement

By 1945, however, the Soviet attitude had changed. Answering a Norwegian request for negotiations on an air route between Oslo and Moscow in the autumn of 1945, Assistant Foreign Minister Dekanozov stated categorically that the Soviet Union did not give air concessions to foreign countries, and that it did not accept foreign air routes to cross its borders.[12]

In March 1946, DNL sought to set up a weekly courier route to Moscow. Joachim G. Urby, a pilot and general manager in DNL, told the Norwegian Foreign Ministry that the Soviet ambassador in Oslo was positive, implying that the negative Soviet attitude from the Fall of 1945 might have changed

again.[13] Accordingly, a delegation from DNL, the Foreign Ministry, and the Ministry of Transportation went to Moscow for negotiations with the Soviet Union in May 1946.[14] The Soviets were willing to negotiate, but denied foreign airplanes access to Soviet airspace except for newly conquered Klaipeda, the former German city of Memel. The Soviets offered Norway a route to Klaipeda from which Soviet planes and staff would take over on the final leg to Moscow. In return, they demanded flight rights to Oslo.[15] It seems that either the Soviet ambassador in Oslo was more positive toward relations than his superiors in Moscow, or that Mr. Urby in DNL had been too optimistic in his interpretation.

Other Western countries encountered the same demands when attempting to negotiate aviation agreements in 1946: The Soviets wanted access all the way to the Western capital, while the Western side was not allowed to operate beyond Klaipeda.

The Norwegian Foreign Ministry files which reported from the negotiations, does not say anything about the Soviet reasons for denying flights into Soviet airspace outside of Klaipeda. But a later US document, proposing a common policy for Nato members toward aviation relations with the Soviet Union in 1958, gives a reasonable explanation. The note includes a background chapter where the US delegation to Nato's Committee of Political Advisors claim that the USSR in the first decade after World War II showed little interest in international air routes due to "the profound distrust and suspicion with which the Soviets regarded all efforts to fly over or land in USSR territory by non-Soviet aircraft – rights which Western nations would naturally have expected in return for granting the Soviet airline similar privileges."[16]

The only route between the Soviet Union and the West in the late 1940s became a joint Swedish ABA – Soviet Aeroflot route from Stockholm to Moscow via Helsinki, with Swedish planes flying Stockholm–Helsinki and Soviet planes flying Moscow–Helsinki.[17] A quasi-solution where neither country allowed the other access to its airspace. Except to Finland, which at this time as a recently defeated enemy, would not be in a position to object.

No other air agreements were reached for the remainder of Stalin's reign, even though the Soviet ambassador to Oslo, N.D. Kuznetsov both in 1947 and 1948 suggested a restart of the failed negotiations of 1946. Kuznetsov wrote two letters to Foreign Minister Molotov, suggesting that an aviation agreement might be a part of a diplomatic thrust to counter the ever-growing US and British influence in Norway (Holtsmark, 1995, p. 376–379). Yet nothing came of these initiatives, and I have not seen any replies from Moscow to the suggestions.

No-fly zones?

In the spring of 1946, the Norwegian Armed Forces High Command discussed how to respond to calls for abolishing the general prohibition against civil

aviation which the Defense Ministry established in 1939, when war was looming. Cpt. Tarald Weistein from the Air Force staff pleaded with his fellow officers not to put up any kind of hindrances against the future development of civil aviation.[18] The new and recently reestablished airlines were to a large degree manned by former Air Force personnel, and I interpret the comment from Cpt. Weistein to imply that there was at least some sympathy within the Air Force for a liberal approach to aviation.

Other members of the military leadership held different views, of course. Gen. Munthe Dahl, Commander of the Armed Forces Staff and head of the committee was convinced, for example, that the regular German Lufthansa flights to Norway in the late 1930s had also been used as covert photo-espionage flights, preparing for the German invasion in 1940. In a PM to the High Commands of the Army, Navy and Air Force, he stated that the freedom to fly over Norway before the War was used by the German airline to gather information and photographs which became a valuable help for the later invasion.[19] Munthe Dahl recognized the need not to lay undue restrictions on civil aviation, so he recommended designating certain areas as forbidden for civil aviation, more commonly called no-fly zones. These zones would cover flights of all nationalities, not just enemies.

It was obviously a difficult task, for by December 1947, no decision had been taken, and the Ministry of Transportation felt the need to ask for clarifications. The Transport Ministry strongly urged the military not to but any limits on aviation at all, regarding no-fly-zones, and used Portugal as an example of a country wholly without such zones.[20] A couple of years later, general prohibition had been lifted and replaced with a number of photo-restricted zones, eventually numbering around 500.[21]

CSA

Czechoslovakia signed an aviation agreement with several Western countries, including Norway, in 1946.[22] In the first postwar years, Prague became the main aviation gateway between east and west. Soviet airline Aeroflot operated routes between Moscow and Prague, and some Western airlines also flew to Prague. In return, Czechoslovak airline CSA operated routes to Western Europe. But, referring to CIA sources, Marc Dierikx claim that the US in particular was deeply skeptical toward CSA, as a potential espionage platform for the Soviet Union, and a way "to provide western communist parties with a rapid link to Moscow" (Dierikx, 2008, loc771)

CSA did not operate any route to Norway. But in 1952, the Czechoslovak airline applied for permission to open a regular route between Prague and Oslo. Wilhelm Evang, Head of Norwegian Military Intelligence, recommended that the application be denied. In the clearest example among the source material I have found, he reasoned that an air route between Oslo and

Prague would have little economic value and the only other value would be for transporting spies. Evang also pointed to the same example from before the War as Munthe Dahl had done, that the Germans had used civil air routes to Norway for intelligence purposes. He also had had reports on CSA being used by the Czechoslovak Intelligence Services for espionage.[23] He does not reveal from where, but given the US attempts to influence its allies regarding curtailing East bloc aviation relations, as Dierikx writes about, CIA would be a possible source.

For the head of Military Intelligence himself to write a recommendation on a civil air route application, is a rather rare incident. I have not seen his direct involvement before or after. I believe this strengthens the view Dierikx present, that CSA at this stage was viewed with particular distrust in the West. The extent of Evang's relations with US intelligence has never been fully uncovered and the files from his directorship at Military Intelligence are still classified. But judging from other events, like the U2 Incident in particular, one might imagine the US distrust of CSA to have colored his views.[24]

By this point in time only KLM, Sabena, SAS and Swissair continued operations across the Iron Curtain. And the SAS route was, in reality a purely Swedish operation: A route to Helsinki in Finland, from where Soviet Aeroflot continued on toward Moscow.[25]

When SAS was planning its route from Scandinavia to Tokyo in the mid-1950s, SAS Chief Navigator Einar Sverre Pedersen praised the new potential for routes over the Pole but lamented the inaccessibility of the even shorter route over Siberia.[26] Access to destinations in the Soviet Union would be clear progress, but the real prize for SAS was Tokyo and the Far East. But at this point in time a Trans-Siberia-route was a pipe dream.

It was the Soviet position which prohibited aviation relations in the early Cold War. Even without access to Soviet sources, it is no large stretch to claim that this was due to fears of Western espionage. Norway and most other Western countries were genuinely interested in negotiating agreements, as long as they were reciprocal.[27] But even so, there certainly was skepticism toward Soviet intentions and even toward civil aviation in general, in Norway and the West. Based on the examples mentioned, it would seem that the aviation skeptics were in the ascendancy on both sides of the Iron Curtain in the early Cold War. The voices arguing for open skies were fewer.

After Stalin, new opportunities

The relationship between the Soviet Union and the Western Bloc in the decades following Stalin's death was often volatile, but usually more flexible. Regarding aviation, interest in economic cooperation eventually overcame some of the fear of espionage.

Aeroflot took the initiative for change, in the Fall of 1955. New SAS CEO Throne Holst was invited to Moscow for discussions, ostensibly about the ABA – Aeroflot agreement on the Stockholm–Moscow route with change of planes in Helsinki.[28] While in Moscow, the Soviets suggested that with the recent changes in Scandinavian aviation, where the old Norwegian, Danish and Swedish airlines had formally ended as operational airlines in favor of the joint company SAS, it would perhaps be wise to seek more formal bilateral aviation agreements with the Scandinavian governments.[29]

This Soviet change of heart was welcomed in all three Scandinavian capitals, and negotiation teams were dispatched within a month. Both from the Scandinavian and Soviet side, it was agreed that there should be three separate agreements, but that negotiations should be joint. And the negotiated agreements which were signed 31 March 1956 were identical.

The agreement was quite specified and limited: Only one airline from each side, four ground crew stationed, only the following two routes within the Soviet Union to be flown: Oslo – Riga – Moscow and Oslo – Leningrad – Moscow, and strict limitations on aircraft types.[30] At the same time, SAS and Aeroflot sat down to negotiate operational aspects like ticket sales procedures, fuel and maintenance, currency conversions, etc. It was far from unusual that bilateral aviation agreements of the era were extraordinary detailed. It was also anticipated, and the Scandinavian teams were in agreement on trying to copy the recent Austrian-Soviet aviation agreement from November 1955.[31] It did however lead to immediate Scandinavian requests for additions and revisions regarding new air routes, larger aircraft types, and the most important: Access not only for routes to the Soviet Union, but for transit to Asia (Kleve, 2019).

Until the end of the Cold War, the agreement with Norway received 8 written revisions. Mostly all three Scandinavian countries negotiated together and entered similar agreements, except on the issue of Cuba. Each revision entailed greater access to Soviet airspace for larger aircraft. But only 1971 was Siberian airspace opened to non-Soviet air traffic, and widebody aeroplanes were only allowed in 1981. And always just one airline from each side (see Kleve, 2019 for a more detailed account).

Why this turnaround of Soviet positions? Khrushchev's emergence as General Secretary of the Communist Party and undisputed leader of the Soviet Union after 3 years of power struggle after the death of Stalin would be the first premise (Dierikx, 2008, loc, p. 783). There have been several studies of the changes in Soviet foreign Policy with Khrushchev's ascension to power. His rapprochement with Tito's Yugoslavia, the signing of the Austrian State Treaty and other activities aimed at promoting more peaceful relations with the West (See f.ex. Adelman & Palmieri, 1989, p. 147–149). But none have mentioned the results for aviation.

Stian Bones argues that the change in Soviet general positions toward the West was also due to Norwegian Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen and his trip

to Moscow immediately before the invitation of Throne-Holst from SAS (Bones, 2006, p. 276–286). In October 1955, Einar Gerhardsen took the initiative for a trip to Moscow together with his wife Werna and Trade Minister Arne Skaug in order to improve relations. The trip caused an internal dispute within the ruling Labor Party, where many feared Gerhardsen would be receptive to Soviet approaches for collaboration.

A letter from Soviet Prime Minister Bulganin of 19 March 1957 to Gerhardsen – made public in the press in both Norway and the Soviet Union a week later – declared that the aviation agreement was one of the tangible results of Gerhardsen's trip.[32] At the same time, the Soviet ambassador to Oslo mentioned the aviation agreement as an area where the Soviet Union had changed position, during a dinner at the Soviet embassy for the leadership in the Norwegian Foreign Ministry.[33] The highest-ranking Norwegian guest at the dinner was Foreign Minister Hallvard Lange, a staunch critic of Gerhardsen's Moscow visit. I interpret the letter and the ambassador's comment as implying that aviation was one of the areas the new Soviet leadership saw opportune to express their new policy of what later became known among Western scholars as trying to promote peaceful coexistence (Adelman & Palmieri, 1989, p. 151).

Concurrent Western attitudes

Although most Western nations were eager to follow Scandinavia in entering aviation agreements with the Soviet Union, security circles were worried that Soviet intelligence would be using the new Aeroflot routes for intelligence purposes.[34] At the same time, though, it seems that some Western powers too, planned to use their airlines for the exact same purpose they suspected the Soviets of wanting. In a telegram to the Canadian High Commissioner in Ottawa, the UK Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Sir Alec Douglas-Home in November 1955 wrote that "We consider that this initiative is not inconsistent with the 'containment' policy (...) for there might be some intelligence advantage to be gained from such flights,"[35] in a report on a meeting of the Nato Foreign Ministers in Geneva, where a resumption of civil East-West flights was one of the topics being discussed.

The fear of espionage-angle was also prominent in the discussions in the newly established Nato-Committee of Political Advisors in the years immediately after 1956. Confidential reports from a series of meetings in the Committee in 1958, provide rather important arguments for the importance of the threat of espionage in East-West aviation relations. The meetings were held to discuss a common policy with regards to civil aviation, following a note submitted from the US delegation, proposing that the Nato member states adopt a common policy of caution toward the Soviet bloc, denying Soviet and its East European allies access to sensitive areas and recognize that the Soviet

Union would in all likelihood attempt to use aerial access to the Western countries to further its "unrelenting search for world mastery by international communism".[36]

The reports are interesting in their rather frank language. The political committee was a recent invention, set up in 1957 to provide an arena for discussing nonmilitary cooperation, and consisted of diplomatic representatives from each member-country. The discussions disclosed the rather typical opposing views on aviation. Delegations were split on the proposal to limit Soviet access. Some felt that technical, commercial and other political considerations beside security "might prove strong enough to over-balance the political risks of granting such access".[37] The committee was therefore not able to agree on a common policy, except for some guidelines. Among the most important were the principle of equivalent advantages (reciprocicality): That agreements should ensure at least the same advantages and access to Soviet airspace as given to the Soviet side. And each member should take "measures for dealing with any threat to internal security."[38]

Developments after 1956

The fear of espionage in civil aviation did not disappear with the agreement on formal aviation relations. But the number of discussions on allowing East-Bloc aeroplanes access to Norwegian airspace are much fewer in the sources.

Although the 1956-agreement did for the first time allow for flights between Norway and the Soviet Union, it was severely constrained. SAS exercised a constant pressure on the Foreign Ministry and Transportation Ministries to renegotiate and expand the agreement.[39] The initiatives usually came from the Norwegian or Scandinavian side. But occasionally the Soviet Union saw the need for revisions, like when Cuba in the late 1950s became part of its sphere of influence, and the Soviet Union wanted direct flights there (Kleve, 2019). The shortest route to Cuba leads through Norwegian airspace. USA wanted to deny Soviet flights to Cuba and requested its allies to deny airlines from the Soviet bloc access to their airspace for flights to Havana. Most Nato-allies complied with this US request.[40] The Norwegian government position was, as Solberg in the Foreign Ministry stated in a memo in June 1965: To comply with a Soviet request for transfer rights through Norwegian airspace to Cuba would make "the political load towards the US large enough that one would have to expect suggestions in the US Congress of wide retaliatory measures."[41]

The tight agreement made the number of actual Soviet-bloc routes and destinations in Norway low, and there is less mention of problems with espionage from Soviet or East Bloc aircraft in Ministries-sources during the 1960s and 1970s. The 1956 agreement designated specific air routes and airports to use, and the Norwegian military was as anxious as their Soviet

counterparts that the number of airports and routes be severely limited. Several of the Norwegian airports were financed over the Nato Infrastructural Aid-program and served as combined military airbases and civil airports. Norwegian military authorities routinely denied Soviet or East European airlines landing rights at these airports and set restrictions on routes to avoid military sensitive areas.[42]

By this time, accessible public sources become fewer. But if we turn to a different source: newspapers, we do see occasional articles on espionage in civil aviation. The Norwegian daily VG reported that Soviet fears of aerial espionage was the main reason for break in negotiations over access to Siberia in 1964. In an article about SAS-investments in new jet airplanes, VG reported that the airline was nervous about developments in negotiations between the Soviet Union and Japan about transit rights across Siberia. Such negotiations had stranded several times before due to "Moscow's fear of aerial espionage."[43]

From time to time Norwegian newspapers reporting from unnamed US or British sources claiming that large numbers of Soviet staff at Aeroflot in Norway could be spies. Stavanger Aftenblad published an article titled "61 out of 95 Russians in Norway spy" 14 March 1973, citing a report from British-based Institute for Conflict Studies.[44] Aftenposten published a similar article titled "Extensive Soviet espionage across the world" 25 September 1971, citing unnamed US sources claiming that 50–60% of Soviet personnel at embassies and companies like TASS Aeroflot were intelligence operatives.[45]

The late Cold War and the Balkan Air charter case

During the first half of the 1980s, relations between East and West became more constrained. USA went so far as to deny Aeroflot flights to the US from 1981, and ended Pan Am's routes to the Soviet Union, too. Until the end of the 1980s there were no direct routes between USA and the Soviet Union. This coincided with a more hostile attitude from the Soviet side, and greater fears for a Western attack (Herman & Hughes, 2013, p. 61).

Norwegian-Soviet aviation relations did not change particularly. But there was one incident which showed that fear of espionage was still alive and well and had consequences for civil aviation: The Balkan Air charter case in 1984.

Dick van der Aart claims that East European airlines increased their espionage activities in this period with the emergence of Bulgaria and Romania as charter destinations (van der Aart, 2018, p. 151–154). My own studies of Norwegian newspapers indicate a surge in interest in risks of espionage by Soviet-bloc airlines in the years 1983–1985.[46] The majority of these connected to the attempts by Norwegian chartertour-operators Vingreiser and Arctic Express, to set up charter tours from North Norway to Bulgaria in the summer of 1984, using planes from Bulgarian airline Balkan Air.

Espionage is probably not the main reason why Balkan Air suddenly appears on stage as an operator on North Norwegian airports. Rather, I would argue that it connects to the general, huge growth in charter leisure travel in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Aasbø, 2009; Seth, 2008). New travel agencies in North-Western Europe specializing in charter tours to the sunny beaches of Southern Europe emerged. They were on constant lookout for new exciting and inexpensive destinations. Bulgaria had recently increased its foreign debt in attempts to counter growing awareness among its population of the welfare gulf between it and Western Europe. So, the country opened its borders to Western charter travel to its Black Sea beaches. Bulgarian Flag Carrier Balkan Air offered its very reasonably priced services to Western travel agencies.

Usually, charter flights from Norway to Southern Europe ran from Oslo. But Vingreiser decided to test a new marked during the summer of 1983, with the help of the Bulgarian airliner: Direct charter flights from Northern Norway. Four flight were undertaken in July 1983, with the permission of the Civil Aviation Authorities.[47] The company wanted to expand in 1984, and another tour operator also entered the market. Newly established Kirkenes-based Arctic Express proclaimed in North Norwegian Newspapers plans of a large number of charter flights direct to Bulgaria from Bodø, Evenes and Bardufoss airports from March through September. Finally, North Norwegians struggling through a tough life in the cold, dark arctic regions would be able to enjoy the same luxuries as their South Norwegian cousins: Holidays in the sun![48] The Civil Aviation Authorities during the winter of 1984 approved the plans and the use of the airports.

But the Military Security Service put its foot down. All three Northern airports had substantial military activity and were almost fully funded by Nato. Bodø was the headquarter of the Norwegian Northern Military Command and Bardufoss lay at the foot of the Lyngen Line of fortresses expected to bear the brunt of fighting in a potential Soviet invasion. At the height of the late Cold War, there was no way an East Bloc airline would be allowed to operate from these airports. Although Bulgaria was a small Soviet satellite with few perceived interests in Norway, the Bulgarian Intelligence Services was suspected of a number of intelligence operations in the West and perceived as a loyal servant of Soviet Intelligence (Gaddis, 2007, p. 261).[49] Norwegian Military Intelligence, as cited in concurrent newspapers, was very clear in their suspicions that Balkan Air would be attempting espionage while flying in North Norway.[50]

In February 1985, Aftenposten wrote an article with photo-evidence documenting an aeroplane from Polish airline LOT equipped with military grade photo equipment. The plane was photographed when parked at Værnes airport Trondheim awaiting a cargo of beefcalves. The newspaper quoted anonymous military sources stating that East European airlines often undertook

very small transport missions to and from Norway which by themselves could not be financially valid. And the planes would usually attempt to lay their flight path over interesting Norwegian military facilities.[51]

As it turned out, the attempt by Military Security to bloc Balkan Air from operating in North Norway caused a public outcry. Although several newspaper articles expressed understanding for the Security Service's position, most were somewhat hostile. Instead of a focus on the threat of espionage by enemy planes, most articles focused on the great injustice in denying North Norwegians the same easy and inexpensive access to the South as the South-Norwegians had, with headlines like "1.300 North Norwegians being cheated of their Black Sea vacation!" in Nordlandsposten.[52]

The end-result was a compromise. Balkan Air was allowed a few flights from Bodø and Evenes in the summer of 1984. But when the tour operators attempted to resume flights in 1985, they were denied it by a government decision. The decision was announced together with an admission by Ass. Defense Minister Udgaard that they had several clear cases of airplanes from Balkan Air carrying electronic espionage equipment during stays at Norwegian airports.[53] No direct charter flights from North Norway to the sunny South by any airline was resumed again until the end of the 1990s.

Why did this particular case cause such commotion? During the Cold War, Military Security routinely denied Aeroflot and other East-Bloc airlines routes to other airports in Norway except Oslo Fornebu. This usually caused little commotion, only the occasional comment in newspapers. But by the early 1980s, charter vacation to the South had become tremendously popular, and it seems the large and growing public interest in charter flights by this time trumped security considerations for many.[54]

I do not have the impression that the supporters of allowing Balkan Air landing rights at Bodø and Evenes airports necessarily disputed the danger of espionage. Its rather that they were more preoccupied with the seemingly great injustice toward the peoples in the North: That closing the airports for Balkan Air would in effect limit vacation charter tours to the population of South Norway.[55]

The Balkan Air charter case is an interesting case of security interests colliding with public expectations of increasing prosperity. From a security perspective, it was inconceivable that Balkan Air, or Aeroflot or LOT could be considered purely commercial companies. That they were utilized for espionage purposes was not doubted.

Balkan Air, like all East Bloc airlines (and several Western) was periodically used by the intelligence services, according to van der Aart (van der Aart, 2018). The reactions from Norwegian Defense circles seems to have been that of surprise over public outcry suddenly becoming so strong. Government and military sources from this period are still inaccessible, but the large number of newspapers writing about this particular case, as

opposed to any other cases or periods during the Cold War, show that the fear of espionage from Soviet-bloc airlines was alive and well as late as the 1980s. But also that the fear among the general public was not greater than their wish for freedom to travel abroad.

Knowing the minds of the Soviet public in this, is difficult. But the Soviet leadership and security services were no less suspicious toward civil airlines and aeroplanes than their Norwegian counterparts. And they were willing to go to considerably longer lengths to make their point, as the downing of Korean Airlines flight 007 in September 1983 is an example off. This was not the first time Soviet Union shot down a civil aeroplane they claimed was being used as a vessel for espionage.[56]

Fear of espionage in the post-Cold War era

The last formal revision of the Norwegian-Soviet aviation agreement happened in 1991. Additionally, it was then agreed to change the name of the Soviet Union to Russia. After this point, there has been a common understanding of the need for a new, modernized agreement.[57] But proper negotiations have been difficult to achieve. According to both written sources, newspaper articles and the head of the Ministry of Transportation's aviation negotiation team, Russian reluctance to a more liberal approach has been the main obstacle.[58] In 1994, EU-members and partner countries like Norway decided to liberalize aviation and dissolve the old system of flag carriers and concession monopolies. USA had already gone through a similar process in its domestic market a few years earlier. This revolutionized European and North American aviation, by causing the establishment of a number of new low-cost airlines and plummeting prizes. An important demand from the Norwegian side in the post-Cold War era has therefore been to let additional airlines into Russian airspace. The Russians have agreed in practice to allow the airline Norwegian into parts of its airspace. But it continues to be restrictive on access to Siberian airspace, making a new agreement difficult to achieve.

Conclusions

International aviation developed gradually toward more openness during the Cold War, despite the risks of increased espionage, because the advantages of fast and easy communications has trumped the disadvantages. As witnessed in the debate in the Nato Committee of Political Advisors. The lack of espionage as an argument in most existing literature, combined with its mostly quite narrow focus on intra-Western relations, point to some maybe rather obvious conclusions: That international aviation relations developed most where trust was reasonably high, ie between the Western allies. And it developed slow and ponderous where trust was low to non-existent, ie across the Iron Curtain.

I do not dispute the view of Dobson and other historians, that reasons of national sovereignty have been a dominant argument for control of airspace and limitations on international aviation. But as this study has attempted to show, I do believe a more nuanced approach are in order. Dobson and Haanappel point to limitations on international aviation due to economic protectionism as the main focus of early Cold War-aviation superpower Britain during the Chicago negotiations in 1944. I believe the fear for espionage should be considered too, when one look at international aviation in an East-West perspective instead of the purely Western perspective common in previous studies.

The word "Fear" here, is perhaps not fully correct, as it implies some irrationality. And as this study has underlined, the use of civil aviation for espionage purposes was a very real threat. But with its faults acknowledged, I still believe it is the best expression of the main control-side issue in East-West aviation relations during the Cold War.

Where trust was high, it was fear of undermining state sovereignty over its own airspace, which slowed the drive toward open skies. Between the Western and the Soviet Bloc where trust was low, it seems that the fear of espionage was the main obstruction.

Fear for loss of sovereignty proved the easiest to handle. It could be neutered with good agreements, since it was an issue primarily between parties of high trust. The fears and suspicions of espionage were harder to quell since lack of trust made agreements less trustworthy. You do not trust your contractual partner to uphold the agreement. On the contrary, you expect him to stretch it or break it. And as I have shown here, you might even plan to undermine it yourself.

Notes

1. Turkey does the same but joined the Nato-alliance much later.
2. Unsigned note marked "Oslo 7.5.1943," probably written by de facto DNL Head of Operations during the war years 1940–43, Leif Villars-Dahl, box marked "DNL's utvikling frem til SAS – Diverse brev og dokumenter 1945–47," SAS Museum Archive, Gardermoen, Norway.
3. The Soviet Union finally signed the Convention in 1970.
4. Dobson admits that the Soviet Union was one of the largest aviation nations in the world. But his focus is on the development of the international aviation system and market, where the Soviet Union played a very small direct role.
5. Dierikx comments on a growing Western fear that Czech airline CSA, the only East Bloc airline with a reasonably extensive route network to Western Europe in the late 1940s, "could serve as a vehicle to gather intelligence, facilitate the placement of agents in the West, and provide communist parties in Western Europe with a rapid link to Moscow". Loc 771.
6. 13 US and one Swedish intelligence plane was shot down in or near Soviet airspace up to 1960, according to Herman, *What Difference*, 43

7. Historian and former Dutch intelligence operative Cees Wiebes and his intelligence colleagues sometimes asked KLM-pilots to make small deviations from the normal flight paths when entering Soviet airspace. Thus, they allowed Western signal intelligence stations to track the operations and readiness of Soviet Early Warning systems. A valuable piece of information in case of a Western attack. Interview with Cees Wiebes by Karl L. Kleve, Oslo, Norway, 30 November 2017.
8. Previous Norwegian studies of the international aviation regime are few. I used Foreign, Transportation and Defense Ministry archives, some of which, in particular the Foreign Office files for 1960–69, became declassified and available only during my study. The SAS archives are also quite sparingly used by others and somewhat disorganized. Intelligence archives are not available at all, but intelligence records do appear in other government archives.Access to Foreign archives is also difficult due to records being classified. I received valuable assistance from Dick van der Art and Canadian archivist Daniel German regarding Nato- and British/Commonwealth files. Due to language barriers and general unavailability of archives for researchers, Soviet sources are few, except some collected by other historians during the more open 1990s. But Polish intelligence sources may give valuable insights when they become more available in the near future. I recommend future studies to utilize Polish sources when they become accessible, for closer insights into Soviet and East Bloc-attitudes toward aviation relations and espionage fears.Due to the absence of sources after 1969, the Balkan Air case of 1984 relies on a very different kind of source: Newspapers. The perspective is therefore another: Newspaper editors and the general public instead of public policymakers.
9. Unsigned note marked "Oslo 7.5.1943," probably written by de facto DNL Head of Operations during the war years 1940–43, Leif Villars-Dahl, box marked "DNL's utvikling frem til SAS – Diverse brev og dokumenter 1945–47," SAS.
10. Correspondence from the Norwegian Ministry of Defense in exile in London to the Foreign Ministry, 6 January 1944, Box 12017, UD 1940–49, RA.
11. Ibid. Sweden had approached the Soviet Union on the same purpose a short time before Norway did.
12. The Moscow Embassy to the Foreign Ministry, 29 September 1945, Box 12017, UD 1940–49, RA.
13. Unsigned Foreign Ministry memoranda 15 March 1946, Box 12017, UD 1940–49, RA.
14. Set out in a long memo by the Board of DNL, "Fremstilling av hovedtrekkene i Det Norske Luftfartsselskap A/S's utvikling 1946–1948 og forslag til retningslinjer for selskapets fremtidige virksomhet," 14 January 1949, 124, Box "DNL's utvikling frem til SAS – Diverse brev og dokumenter 1945–47," SAS.
15. The Norwegian embassy to the Foreign Ministry, 15 May 1946, Box 12017, UD 1940–49, RA.
16. Note by the United States delegation to the Nato Committee of Political advisors, titled «Common policy with respect to civil aviation relations with the USSR and European satellite countries», 12 March 1958, Box AC 119-WP 58 4 3.
17. The Embassy in Stockholm to the Foreign Ministry, 25 January 1954, Box 3563, Archival Code 55.15, UD 1950–59, RA, with the Swedish press release of a 1954 amendment to the 1946 agreement. Strangely, this agreement is not mentioned in the Foreign Ministry archives for 1940–49. The ongoing Swedish and Danish negotiations (which happened at the same time as the Norwegian ones) were noted, but the last reference to Swedish negotiations, in a message from the Norwegian embassy to the Foreign Ministry on 29 June 1946, was that the Swedish delegation were deeply offended, having left Moscow after five weeks without having met the Soviet negotiators once. See also Kleve, *Making Iron Curtain Overflights legal.*

18. Protocol from a meeting in the Armed Forces High Command in Oslo, 8 March 1946. Box 1220/D/Da/Dab/L0732, RAFA, RA.
19. "Military restrictions on civil aviation. Forbidden areas, etc", PM from Col E. Munthe Dahl in Defense Staff to the High Commands of the Army, Air Force and Navy, November 11 1946, Box 1220 D Da Dab L0726, RAFA, RA.
20. Letter from Haakon Breien, Ministry of Transportation, to the Ministry of Defense, 12 December 1947, Box 1220 D Da Dab L0732, RAFA, RA.
21. «Forbidden areas, etc». Letter from Col. Waage and Maj. Manshaus to the Defense Staff, 3 June 1947, «Rules regarding photographing from the air and rules for censorship of photos taken from the air". 5 June 1946, Box 1220 D Da Dab L0732, RAFA, RA.
22. Attachment to Norwegian-Czechoslovak aviation agreement 7 Mai 1946, Box S-2610 D Da L0087 0005, SD, RA
23. Czech air route Prague – Copenhagen – Oslo, note from Head of Military Intelligence Wilhelm Evang to the Norwegian Defense and Foreign Ministers, 5 January 1953, Box 3356, UD 1950–59, RA
24. For a short study of the U2-Incident and the extent of Evang's involvment, see Kleve (2008), p. 38–41.
25. The Embassy in Stockholm to the Foreign Ministry, 25 January 1954, Box 3563, Archival Code 55.15, UD 1950–59, RA, with the Swedish press release of a 1954 amendment to the 1946 agreement.
26. Memoranda from SAS Chief Navigator Einar Sverre Pedersen titled «Sivil flyvning i de arktiske områder», undated but probably 1954, in Box marked «Åpning av rute til Seattle via den polare ruten. Åpning av den Trans–Sibirske rute til Tokio, Bangkok og Manila,» SAS Museum Archive, Gardermoen, Norway.
27. British ambassador to Norway, Sir Laurence Collier, told Norwegian Foreign Minister Hallvard Lange that the UK government were anxious that all uphold the important principles of reciprocality in negotiations with the USSR, 3 June 1946, 12017, UD 1940–49, RA.
28. Finn Skartum, Head of the Foreign Ministry's 5th Office of Trade Policy, memo, 23 November 1955, Box 3542, UD 1950–59, RA.
29. For a closer look at the negotiations between Norway and the Soviet Union, see Kleve (2019).
30. Agreement between Norway and the Soviet Union concerning aviation relations, 31 March 1956, https://lovdata.no/dokument/TRAKTAT/traktat/1956-03-31-1. The agreement is also printed in *Norges traktater 1661–1966: Bind III 1956–1967* (Oslo: Det Kgl. Norske Utenriksdepartement, 1968), p 45–49. Afterward, the two named airlines entered their own agreement: Agreement between SAS and Aeroflot, 31 March 1956, Box 3542, UD 1950–59, RA.
31. Finland became the first nation to enter into an aviation agreement with the Soviet Union, at 19 October 1955, followed by Jugoslavia and Austria in November. Even Soviet's own allies in Eastern Europe had to wait until 1956.
32. Minutes of the meeting of the Extended Foreign and Constitution Committee of the Norwegian Parliament, 23 March 1957, https://www.stortinget.no/globalassets/pdf/stortingsarkivet/duuk/1946–1965/570323u.pdf.
33. Minutes of the meeting of the Extended Foreign and Constitution Committee of the Norwegian Parliament, 23 March 1957, https://www.stortinget.no/globalassets/pdf/stortingsarkivet/duuk/1946–1965/570323u.pdf, with foreign minister Hallvard Lange's account of what the Soviet ambassador said at dinner.

34. Note by the United States delegation to the Nato Committee of Political advisors, titled «Common policy with respect to civil aviation relations with the USSR and European satellite countries», 12 March 1958, Box AC 119-WP 58 4 3, Nato Archives Online.
35. Telegram to the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in Ottawa from the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, 10 November 1955, file «Soviet Expansion of Civil Aviation in Europe, RG 25, Volume 3384, File-AHN-40 C, Library and Archives Canada.
36. Report by the Committee of Political Advisors titled «Common policy with respect to civil aviation relations with the USSR and European satellite countries», 23 September 1958, Box AC 119-WP 58 4 3, Nato Archives Online.
37. Ibid, p. 1.
38. Ibid, p. 2.
39. From the mid-1960s, responsibility for negotiating and preparing aviation agreement was gradually transferred to the Ministry of Transportation.
40. Ibid. In October 1962, the Norwegian Nato-delegation sent a memorandum to the Norwegian Foreign Office, detailing the British positions on flight to Cuba. The UK complied with the US request, same as Norway. And the compliance was not questioned. Memo from the Norwegian Nato delegation to the Norwegian Foreign Office, 5 November 1962, Box S-6794 D Da Dad L3277, UD 1960–69, RA. This memo is one of several which writes about the US request and take compliance for granted. I would assume that no Nato-ally would want to endanger their relationship with the Us for such a small matter.
41. Note from WG Solberg, 6th Trade Office of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry to the Foreign Minister, regarding the upcoming visit to Norway of Soviet aviation Minister Loginov, 9 June 1965. Box S-6794 D Da Dad L3245, UD 1960–69, RA.
42. Se f.ex. the memo from the Defense Ministry to the Transport Ministry on 20 June 1964 titled «Use of the airports Flesland, Værnes and Andøya for civil air routes», Box S-6794 D Da Dad L3247, UD 1960–69, RA; Letter from Steinar Wang in the Defense Ministry to the Armed Forces Staff, requesting the Staff's views on potential use of Banak Airport for foreign airlines, 3 June 1964, Box S-6794 D Da Dad L3247, UD 1960–69, RA; PM from Col. Helge Mehre, Head of the Operational Staff in the Armed Forces Staff, to his superior, summarizing the problems of allowing Soviet airlines access to Fornebu, 11 February 1956, Box 3542, UD 1950–59, RA; or The request on how to handle Aeroflot flights over Norwegian territory during a temporary shortage of air traffic controllers in Denmark, resulting in a number of Soviet requests for unscheduled overflights of Norwegian airspace, from the Civil Aviation Authorities to the Defense Ministry, 17 October 1980, S-1713 D Db L0131, SD, RA.
43. «Caravellen inn på norske ruter med jet-fart», VG, 4 June 1964.
44. Stavanger Aftenblad, 14 March 1973.
45. Aftenposten, 25 September 1971. Similar articles can be found in Morgenbladet, 28 October 1983 and several other articles and papers.
46. www.nb.no/search?q = aeroflot%20spionasje&mediatype = aviser&fromDate = 19000101&toDate = 19991231. Searches on keywords like aviation and espionage in the large database of Norwegian newspapers at the National Library show that there is the odd newspaper article every year during the 1950s to 1970s. But only some 10 to 20 each year, except for 1983 (94 articles), 1984 (84 articles) and 1985 (73 articles)
47. Nordlandsposten, 17 April 1984. Se also «Vingreiser fikk ja» in Nordlands Framtid 9 May 1983.

48. «Forsvaret vil nekte Arctic Express å fly fra Evenes» in Harstad Tidende 16 December 1983
49. See also newspaper-articles like «Charter-Spionasje», Dagbladet 2 May 1985, «Spion-fly nektes å besøke Bodø», Nordlands Framtid 2 May 1985, «Bodø og andre flyplasser stengt for øst-europeiske fly», Nordlands Framtid 2 February 1985.
50. "Spion-fly nektes å besøke Bodø", Nordlands Framtid 2 May 1984, "Bulgarske fly risikerer landingsforbud her nord", Nordlands Framtid 19 December 1983.
51. *Civil aeroplane with espionage equipment*, Aftenposten 6 June 1985. VG had run a similar article 8 years earlier, reporting observations of crew at Aeroflot-planes taking photos while overflying Kjeller outside Oslo, and other military bases: *I saw the pilot with camera*!, VG 12 March 1977.
52. *1.300 North Norwegians being cheated of their Black Sea vacation*, Nordlandsposten 17 April 1984.
53. *Charter-espionage*, Dagbladet 2 May 1985.
54. Another explanation could be that the North Norwegian general struggle against perceived injustices from the dominant South Norway played a role in shaping public perceptions. This case did after all follow right behind the conflict and demonstrations surrounding the large hydroelectric power plant-project in the Alta river in Finnmark, a conflict which had created deep dissatisfaction with authorities in Oslo, among a large part of the Northern population.
55. *1.300 North Norwegians being cheated of their Black Sea vacation*, Nordlandsposten 17 April 1984,"1300 får Bulgaria-ferie ødelagt," Aftenposten 13 April 1984.
56. Some other examples are the Soviet shooting at the Air France flight to Berlin Tempelhof in April 1952 where 2 passengers were injured, a Sabena-flight near the Austro-Jugoslav border in June 1954 where 2 were killed, El-Al over Bulgaria was shot down with 58 dead in June 1955 and KAL 902 shot at and forced to do an emergency landing at an ice-covered lake at the Kola Pensinsula in April 1978, with 2 passengers killed.
57. Protocoll from the 16th meeting in the Norwegian–Russian government commission for economic, industrial, research and technology cooperation, 10–11 June 2013, www.regjeringen.no.
58. Interview with Øyvind Ek (Head of the Aviation Section in the Norwegian Transport Ministry) by Karl L. Kleve, Oslo, Norway, 18 October 2017. This has also been the subject of several newspaper articles the last decade, in Aftenposten, Dagens Næringsliv, VG, etc.

Notes on contributor

Karl Lorentz Kleve is Historian and Curator at Norwegian National Aviation Museum in Bodø, since 1998. My responsibilities are research, collections management and outreach. In addition, I have had several commissions like lecturer at Nord University, Bodø, and for the Norwegian Armed Forces, Union representative for the Researchers Union, Project Manager for Project Ice Frontier, National contact for the Baltic Initiative (the North European Network of Cold War Museums and Memorial sites), etc.

I am Cand. Philol in History from the University in Oslo, 1995. With minors in Political Science and Russian/East European Studies.

My responsibilities are general Norwegian aviation history. My research has primarily focused on Norwegian aviation history connected to the Cold War. My latest publication is a study of the Norwegian-Soviet aviation agreement of 1956, to be published in an anthology by Routledge in November 2019, on tourism and travel across the Iron Curtain. I have worked on

how the Cold War affected Norwegian aviation and society, with special emphasis on the High North. Including exhibitions, lectures, radio programmes and TV-interviews. In 2008, I was responsible for a 12-episode radio series on Norwegian aviation history.

References

Aasbø, M. (2009). *De lærte oss å reise – 50 år med norsk charterturisme*. Oslo: Columbus.

Adelman, J. R., & Palmieri, D. A. (1989). *The dynamics of soviet foreign policy*. New York: Harper & Row.

Bartlik, M. (2007). *The impact of EU law on the regulation of international air transportation*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Bones, S. (2006). Med viten og vilje: Einar Gerhardsens reise til Sovjetunionen i 1955. *Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift*, *3*, 276–286.

Dierikx, M. (2008). *Clipping the clouds – How air travel changed the World* (Kindle ed.). Westport, CT: ABC-CLIO.

Dobson, A. (2017). *A history of international civil aviation from its origins through transformative evolution*. London and New York, NY: Routledge.

Eriksen, K. E., & Pharo, H. Ø. (1997). *Norsk Utenrikspolitikks historie, Bind 5: Kald krig og internasjonalisering 1949-1965*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

Gaddis, J. L. (2007). *Den Kalde Krigen*. Norwegian translation. Oslo: Forlaget Historie & Kultur.

Haanappel, P. P. C. (1978). *Ratemaking in international air transport*. Deventer: Kluwer.

Haanappel, P. P. C. (1980). Bilateral air transport agreements 1913-1980. *Maryland Journal of International Law*, *5*, 241–267.

Herman, M., & Hughes, G. (ed). (2013). *Intelligence in the cold war: What difference did it make?* London and New York, NY: Routledge.

Holtsmark, S. G. (1995). *Norge og Sovjetunionen 1917-1955: En utenrikspolitisk dokumentasjon*. Oslo: Cappelen.

Kleve, K. L. (2008). Spionflyet. *Levende Historie*, *5*, 38–41.

Kleve, K. L. (2019). Making iron curtain overflights legal: Soviet–Scandinavian aviation negotiations in the early cold war. In S. B. Pedersen & C. Noack (Eds.), *Tourism and travel during the cold war* (pp. 175–189). London, UK: Routledge.

Lian, J. I. (1989). *Take off: Utviklingen av norsk sivil luftfart*. Oslo: Bedriftsøkonomens Forslag.

Mastny, V., Holtsmark, S. G., & Wenger, A. (ed). (2006). *War plans and alliances in the cold war: Threat perceptions in the East and West*. London and New York, NY: Routledge.

Nerdrum, J. (1986). *Fugl Fønix – En beretning om Det Norske Luftfartsselskap*. Oslo: Gyldendal.

Riste, O., & Moland, A. (1997). *Strengt hemmelig»—Norsk etterretningstjeneste 1945–1970*. Oslo, Norway: Universitetsforlaget.

Rosenberg, A. (1970). *Air travel within Europe*. Stockholm, Sweden: The National Swedish Consumer Council.

Tjomsland, A., & Wilsberg, K. G. (1995). *Mot alle odds*. Oslo, Norway: Braathens SAFE.

van der Aart, D. (2018). *De spionnen van Aeroflot—De luchtvaartmaatschappij van de Sovjet-Unie in de Koude Oorlog*. The Netherlands: Brave New Books.

von Seth, T. (2008). *Charterhistoria*. Lidingö, Sweden: Vivlio.