



4. Equality of opportunity and democratic equality in the case of Indigenous citizenship

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Abstract Norwegian schools are supposed to provide their students with the knowledge and values needed to act as equal democratic citizens. This chapter discusses whether ‘democratic equality’, which is a relational concept, is better suited to promote equal citizenship than ‘equality of opportunity’, which is primarily a principle of distribution. The main question is how equality and citizenship should be conceptualized in order to educate for equal citizenship and provide equal citizenship for Indigenous people.

Keywords Indigenous citizenship | democratic equality | equality of opportunity | shared fate

INTRODUCTION

Within egalitarian liberal theories, there has been an ongoing debate on whether equality of opportunity or adequacy should be the yardstick for just education. The argument for opportunity equality is that education should aim to provide all children with equal opportunities to take advantage of education. Children’s prospects for educational achievement should not be affected by morally irrelevant factors such as ethnicity, gender or class background. Most defenders of the principle of opportunity equality claim that legal protection against discrimination is simply not sufficient in order to realize fair and real equality. The defenders claim that distribution of educational resources should reduce the impact of the cultural, social and economic differences that may affect a student’s educational achievements. This means that resources in many cases should be distributed unevenly. This line of thought has influenced Norwegian education policies for decades and has also been used to justify mainstreaming of education. Traditionally, Norwegian education policy is strongly based on social democratic ideas of social justice, which

include a strong state-driven redistribution (Aasen, 2007). A core national curriculum was first introduced in order to mainstream education, based on the belief that socioeconomic effects of diversity are best reduced by a unified education that assimilates children into a shared national identity (Aasen, 2007; Gjerpe, 2018). In Norway as well as in other welfare states, the belief has been that mainstreaming would give children better access to higher education and employment in the mainstream labour market. For Indigenous people in general, and the Sámi people in particular, such policies resulted in a loss of identity and language competence, as well as marginalization and alienation from both their own culture and the culture of the majority (Banks, 2001, p. 6).

The argument for adequacy is that justice is not primarily a matter of redistribution, but to make sure that everyone has enough to participate as equal citizens in the society (Brighthouse & Swift, 2009, p. 117). Equality is thus a matter of living in a society in which citizens are related as equal. One of the most prominent advocates of the adequacy approach, Elizabeth Anderson, suggests that equality in education should be considered as a matter of democratic equality. The idea ‘democratic equality’ refers to an ‘ideal of social relation, in which people from all walks of life enjoy equal dignity, interact with one another on terms of equality and respect, and are not vulnerable to oppression by others’ (Anderson, 2007, p. 615). The question for this chapter is whether the principle of ‘democratic equality’ can accommodate equal citizenship for Indigenous people and if this approach can stimulate education for equal citizenship.

Historically, citizenship education has been used to justify assimilation policies, with the result that Indigenous people and minorities all over the world have lost their identity and language competence.¹ The pre-World War II Norwegian policy was to assimilate all Sami to be culturally Norwegian, which undermined the Sámi language, culture and identity (Selle & Strømsnes, 2010, p. 68). In the national curricula today, Sámi culture, language and traditions are included as a part of Norwegian heritage. This is due to long processes of struggles for recognition and revitalization of the Sámi language, culture and traditions. As many a scholar has pointed out, Indigenous citizenship is dual or multiple (Vitikainen, 2021). Not only on the level of identity, but also at an institutional level. Norway has recognized the Sámi as Indigenous through national and international legislation and conventions, which have implications for the educational system (Olsen & Andreassen, 2018). In Norway, there are two sets of curricula, one for the national educational system and one for the Sámi administrative areas (Olsen & Andreassen, 2018, p. 2).

1 See the introduction for more information on Norwegian assimilation policies, and Diane Smith’s discussion of the Australian case in Chapter 3.

Citizenship education should therefore have multiple functions. It should ensure Indigenous citizens' rights to develop their own identity, language and institutions. It should promote the common values and shared political principles necessary to participate as equals in the common national society, and ensure the Indigenous citizen access to equal participation on both levels.

According to Anderson, the proper egalitarian aim for education should be that everyone has enough human capital to function as equal in civil society (Anderson, 2007, p. 618). She claims that one of the most severe hindrances for democratic equality is segregation, which contributes to maintaining and transmitting group-based prejudices and stereotypes. She suggests integration as the best remedy against segregation and stereotypes. Students should be educated together in order to develop cross-cultural competence, and the ability to serve the interests of all citizens from all 'walks of life' (Anderson, 2007). In my view, one of the advantages of the democratic equality approach is that it requires that we focus on structural injustices that are embedded in cultural codes and hegemonic cultural discourses.

Integration is important in order to enable citizens with the capacity to participate as equals, but integration would probably not lead to equal standing without institutional changes. Integration, without taking into account questions of how structural and historical injustice is reflected in the very structure of the social and institutional society, is likely to undermine democratic equality rather than promoting it. Citizenship education therefore needs to take historical injustice and the political dimension of how Indigenous people are connected to their language and territory into account.

In most democratic societies, the basic structure and its main institutions are developed in terms of the language and cultural codes of the privileged majority. Institutions are not culturally neutral but are constituted by language and values that have been to the advantage of already privileged groups. To ask people from historically oppressed groups to join established institutions, without awareness of how these institutions are constituted, implies asking them to manage the kind of 'cultural capital' that has been used to oppress them. Anderson's approach is developed in order to counteract the effect of historical injustice. This is something that Anderson is fully aware of, but in order to work against current inequality, rooted in past injustice, her model needs to include separate education as a tool for integration.

There are reasons to believe that integration does not necessarily lead to democratic equality for Indigenous people. Firstly, the concept of democratic equality is based on a 'standard' liberal democratic concept of citizenship, where citizenship is defined in terms of values constitutional for liberal democracies. The standard liberal view is that citizenship does not rely on shared national or cultural

values in a deep sense, but presumes that citizens are morally bound and loyal to certain political principles. John Rawls' idea of citizenship conforms to the standard view. The citizens in Rawls' theory share a moral commitment to common democratic political values and the virtue of reciprocity, which implies that political arguments should proceed within the framework of values acceptable to all (Rawls, 1993).

Inspired by Melissa Williams' concept of citizenship as 'shared fate', I am arguing that equal citizenship for Indigenous and non-Indigenous people challenges conceptions of citizenship that presuppose that the citizens share identity, or require loyalty to certain constitutional principles. The idea of citizenship as shared fate is developed in response to the fact that we exist in social relationships, share political institutions and are dependent on each other, whether we have chosen it or not (Williams, 2007, p. 229). The shared fate approach is thus adapted to a situation where people have multiple identities and loyalties. In my opinion, the shared fate approach is beneficial with regard to citizenship education, because social standing is taken into account. This means that education for citizenship and training for democracy would allow for contested conceptions of the content and extent of public reason, as well as different interpretations of what are considered to be national symbols, narratives and values (Ben-Porath, 2001, p. 383; Williams, 2007, p. 233). I am arguing that if integration should work as a means to democratic equality, citizenship education should be based on a more 'transformative' conception of citizenship than the standard liberal conceptions.

This chapter has two parts. In the first part, I will give an account of how citizenship is accounted for in the national core curriculum (Ministry of Education and Research, 2017). I will also give a rough review of the main features of the equality of opportunity approach, and present how 'democratic equality' is defended as a better approach. Part II is a discussion of whether democratic equality can accommodate equal citizenship for Indigenous people. In this part, I discuss integration through the lens of the standard liberal approach and through the lens of shared fate. I argue that education for equal citizenship should rely on a more transformative conception of citizenship than the standard liberal conception. The chapter ends with some reflections on how equality of opportunity and democratic equality are intertwined.

Discussion of how to define equality in the contexts of education is not new. Discussions of equality of opportunity versus democratic equality in education usually deal with questions of how to balance between equality of opportunity and parental rights, if private education is unjust, or if natural talents deserve to be rewarded (Anderson, 2007; Satz, 2007). Discussions of multicultural education in liberal societies most often deal with questions of how to balance the need for

unity and stability with respect for diversity, and what to do when minorities' perspectives conflict with basic liberal values (Macedo, 2000). Such standard discussion is not the focus in this chapter. My discussion is restricted to how established concepts of educational justice and equality can accommodate and promote education for equal citizenship for Indigenous people.

PART I: EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY VERSUS DEMOCRATIC EQUALITY

Public schools have always been an important tool for creating good citizens. Historically, education for good citizenship and nation building is deeply intermingled. Education has been used as a vehicle for promoting and strengthening national values, as well as creating loyal citizens (Aasen, 2007, p. 28). Public schools have been the site of cultural integration, with the aim of creating loyalty to cultural values, national history and narratives, and national symbols. Promoting loyalty, in order to develop and maintain stability, has been used to justify assimilation policies all over the world. For Indigenous people, these assimilation processes have resulted in loss of identity and first language competence, and alienation from their own culture as well as the culture of the majority (Banks, 2001, p. 6).

From 1850 to 1947, the official Norwegian policy was that the Sámi should be Norwegian, but in practice, the assimilation process has lasted for decades (Gjerpe, 2018, pp. 6–7). By ratifying the International Labor Organization (ILO) convention, Norway has recognized the Sámi people as Indigenous. ILO 169 states that Indigenous and tribal people have the right to develop their language and identity and decide for themselves how to do it. Article 27 states that education programs shall be developed in cooperation with them, to address their specific needs and to incorporate their histories, knowledge and technologies, their value systems and their further social and cultural aspirations. The government should recognize Indigenous peoples' right to establish their own educational institutions within the framework of common standards, decided by competent authorities. Article 28 states that children of Indigenous people have the right to be taught to read and write in their own language (Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989, no. 169). In order to meet the requirements set by the ILO convention, Norway has a parallel set of curricula, one for mainstream Norwegian education and one for Sámi education. The two curricula are the same when it comes to core values and interdisciplinary topics, but the Sámi curricula emphasize topics concerning the Sámi language, culture and history (Olsen & Andreassen, 2018, p. 2). In the national core curriculum, Sámi cultural heritage is defined as a part

of the Norwegian heritage, and students should gain insight into the Sámi people's history, culture and societal life.

The national core curriculum describes knowledge and skills associated with democracy and citizenship within the framework of a pluralistic liberal democratic society. The students should, however, learn about 'the values and traditions that contribute to uniting people in our country' (Ministry of Education and Research, 2017, p. 7). These values are not defined in terms of national culture or identity, but referred to as the values embedded in the Christian and humanistic traditions that have been important in the development of democracy. With this, the core curriculum tries to balance the need for unity and respect for (and value of) differences, by claiming that all students should be given the opportunity to explore their own cultural and language identity within a 'common reference framework'. Common references are considered important, in order to 'create solidarity and connect each individual's identity to the greater community and to a historical context' (Ministry of Education and Research, p. 7).

The core curriculum emphasizes values such as 'human dignity', that requires that everyone should be treated as morally equal, regardless of what makes them different, and 'identity and cultural diversity', that states that all students should be given equal opportunity 'to preserve and develop her or his identity in an inclusive and diverse environment' (Ministry of Education and Research, 2017, p. 7).

Citizenship is usually understood in terms of rights and responsibilities, identity and sense of belonging, and participation. The core curriculum includes all dimensions, but stresses the importance of democratic participation:

By working with democracy and citizenship topics, the pupils shall develop an understanding of the relationship between individual rights and obligations. Individuals have the right to participate in political activities, while society is dependent on citizens exercising their rights to participate in politics and influence developments in the civil society. The school shall stimulate the pupils to become active citizens, and give them the competence to participate in developing democracy in Norway. (Ministry of Education and Research, 2017, p. 16)

Skills that are associated with effective political participation are: 'the ability to understand problems that arise when recognizing dilemmas regarding the opinion of the majority and the rights of minorities', 'critical thinking', and 'the ability to deal with conflicts of opinion and respect disagreement' (Ministry of Education and Research, 2017, p. 8).

Education policies in Norway, as well as in most Western liberal societies, have moved from citizenship education based on unity, to a citizenship education that

is intended to accommodate difference (Olsen & Andreassen, 2018). Norwegian education policy is deeply rooted in the Nordic welfare state model in which redistribution is emphasized as a way to reduce socioeconomic inequalities and to promote social inclusion (Aasen, 2007, p. 129). The Nordic social democratic model after World War II was characterized by the confidence that the state should play an active role in planning and controlling the development of the society. Most of the schools were public institutions. The main idea has been that all children should have an equal chance to obtain a certain level of education, regardless of factors such as geographic location, ethnicity and socioeconomic background, and that education should provide equal opportunities for participation. One of the instruments that was introduced to achieve this aim was to mainstream education by developing a national curriculum in which the minimum of all subjects is defined (Aasen, 2007, p. 130). Mainstreaming of education was justified in the belief that equal citizenship presupposes unity and solidarity across class divisions and differences, and between urban and rural areas. This line of thought can be traced back to T. M. Marshall's influential idea that equal citizenship requires that all members of the society are entitled to civil, political and social rights. He strongly believed that the welfare state is the only form of democracy that can provide equal citizenship, and that social rights would enable the economically marginalized and the working class to make use of their civil and political rights, and to participate in the public sphere of the society (Kymlicka & Normann, 1994, p. 369). For the Sámi people, mainstreaming of education resulted in continued assimilation, which lasted for decades after the official assimilation policy was terminated. The principle of equality of opportunity in the current core curriculum is formulated as such: 'The pupils come to school with different experiences, prior knowledge, attitudes and needs. School must give all pupils equal opportunities to learn and develop, regardless of their background and aptitudes' (Ministry of Education and Research, 2017, p. 19). Today, the principle of equality of educational opportunity is interpreted and applied in accordance with the fact that Sámi traditions are a part of the Norwegian history and heritage, as well as with the aims of protecting and respecting differences, and the student's right to develop his or her identity in an inclusionary environment.

Equality of opportunity: The luck egalitarian approach

In this section, I will explain how the principle of equality of opportunity is defined and justified as a concept for educational justice. Egalitarian theories, based on the concept of equality of opportunity, are in some way or another related to John Rawls' principle 'justice as fairness'. The principle guarantees an equal scheme of

basic liberties for all, and requires not only a formal equality of opportunity, but also a fair equality of opportunity, and restricts inequalities that do not benefit the least advantaged in the society (Rawls, 2001, pp. 41–42).² The principle ‘fair equality of opportunity’ claims all citizens should have equal opportunities regardless of factors such as race, gender, ethnicity or socioeconomic background and that redistribution should aim at eliminating the effect factors such as social class, gender and ethnicity may have on people’s future prospects (Rawls, 2001). The principle of fair equality of opportunity is a principle for distributive justice. The society should organize the distribution of goods in such a way that people with equal talent and effort have equal opportunities in the competitions for positions, power and offices. This requires distributive procedures aimed at reducing the impact of factors that may affect people’s life prospects, but for which they are not responsible.

Adapted to education, the principle of equality of opportunity is most often used to justify a meritocratic principle of opportunity equality, that states that the student’s prospect for educational achievement should not be influenced by her social or cultural background, but by her efforts, interests and talents (Calvert, 2014, p. 72). Since children are entering the school with different knowledge and needs, equality of educational opportunity requires an unequal distribution of resources and goods. Time, money, special assistance and teaching facilities should be distributed in order to reduce the effect of socioeconomic and cultural differences in a way that gives all children equal opportunities to take advantage of education (Aasen, 2007, p. 130).

The principle of educational opportunity is often placed within the family of ‘luck egalitarian’ positions. The term ‘luck egalitarianism’ is a broad term, covering a lot of egalitarian theories. What I am presenting here is just a sketch of the main features of the approach. The main idea is that with inequalities that are the result of chance, no choice is unjust (Quong, 2006, p. 53). People should not be at a disadvantage because of circumstances for which they are not responsible, for instance, socioeconomic and cultural background or illness (Anderson, 1999, p. 288). Adapted to educational policy, it implies that no child should be at an advantage or disadvantage due to socioeconomic background, gender, culture or ethnicity. In society this is a matter of luck, and should not affect your future prospects (Calvert, 2014, p. 74).

2 Rawls suggests that thinking about justice requires that we imagine ourselves as members of an ‘original position’ in which we choose principles for justice behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ that hides all information about personal identity and social situation (Rawls, 1999).

As a principle for justice of education, the principle of equality of opportunity provides a unifying reason why many well-known and identified barriers to equal education, such as class, gender and cultural background, are unjust (Calvert, 2014, p. 79). However, luck egalitarian approaches have been criticized for too narrowly focusing on the distribution of dividable material goods, and for neglecting inequalities rooted in structural and cultural patterns in society (Anderson, 1999; Fraser, 2003). Here it is worth noticing that Will Kymlicka (1995) applies luck egalitarianism to argue for special rights for cultural minorities who have been subject to assimilation and colonization. His argument proceeds as follows: every person has a right to exercise their freedom. Membership in a safe societal culture is a precondition for individuals to exercise their autonomy, or freedom. Societal culture is defined as ‘institutions covering both public and private life, a common language which has historically developed over time in given territories’ (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 81). Indigenous people have, to a significant extent, lost their land, language and institutions. Consequently, Indigenous people do not have equal access to a societal culture, and with this, they do not have an equal opportunity to exercise their autonomy (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 81). These inequalities are not a result of choices made by individuals, and are therefore unjust (Lippert-Rasmussen, 2011, p. 179). Indigenous people can therefore legitimately claim special rights aimed toward protecting their rights to practice their culture and language. This will, for example, justify the right to be educated in one’s own language.

PART II: DEMOCRATIC EQUALITY – A RELATIONAL CONCEPT OF EQUALITY

The question is now if luck egalitarian approaches are sufficient to counteract the epistemic and structural dimensions of injustice, for instance of injustice and bias embedded in so-called value-free knowledge categories can contribute to the marginalization of Indigenous experiences as legitimate sources of knowledge.

Anderson argues that a ‘luck egalitarian’ approach is based on a misconception of egalitarian justice. She proposes democratic equality, which is a relational principle, as an alternative to equality of opportunity. She claims that justice is not a matter of what one person has compared to another, but a matter of what all persons need in order to realize themselves as equal citizens (Anderson, 1999, p. 313). She reminds us that the aim of egalitarianism is to end oppression, which implies ending oppression based on hierarchies in which some persons are seen as superior to others in virtue of factors such as class, gender or ethnicity. Oppression is defined in line with Iris M. Young’s famous and well-known identification of the faces of oppression: marginalization, status hierarchy, domination, explanation

and cultural imperialism (Anderson, 1999, p. 312). The positive aim of egalitarianism is then a society in which individuals are not subjected to any of these kinds of oppression, and stand in a relationship of equality to one another, in the major institutions of the society (Anderson, 2007, p. 620).

Democratic equality is based on the values of equal moral respect and autonomy. However, democracy is not a necessary condition for equal moral respect. The democratic element is specified by reference to the conditions of how to relate to one another as equal citizens. Democratic equality is described as a relationship where one person accepts the obligation to justify his or her actions by principles acceptable to others. This is a relationship where mutual consultation, reciprocity and recognition are taken for granted (Anderson, 1999, p. 313). Democracy is defined as collective self-determination, by means of open discussion in accordance with rules acceptable to all (Anderson, 1999). The principle of democratic equality also has a distributive aspect. Schemes for distribution should aim at adequacy, which refer to the level where everyone has access to the means necessary to realize their freedom and participate as equals in society. Adapted to education, adequacy means that every child should receive the knowledge and skills they need to function as equal citizens, this should also include language competences.

Integration and democratic equality

Anderson identifies two major hindrances for democratic equality: segregation and group-based stereotypes. She argues from within the context of the USA, a society characterized by a high degree of group segregation and vast inequalities along dimensions such as race and class (Anderson, 2007, p. 601). The adequacy approach draws on two insights from Rawls' theory of justice. The first is that human knowledge and talents should be conceived of as public goods. The second is that they should be distributed to the benefit of everyone (Anderson, 2007, p. 621; Howe, 2015). Segregation has a huge impact on how resources, such as economic and cultural capital, transmit and impede knowledge to be distributed to everyone's benefit. Anderson claims that education should aim at creating an 'elite', capable of serving the interests of all members of society, and in particular the interests of the least advantaged. The 'elite occupy positions of responsibility and leadership in society: managers, consultants, professionals, politicians, policy makers' (Anderson, 2007, p. 596). In most democratic societies, the 'elite' is composed of people recruited from the group of the most advantaged in society. The 'advantaged' is defined as 'those who systematically enjoy relatively superior access to resources, social esteem, power, and influence (including elite status) in

virtue of their socially ascribed group identities' (Anderson, 2007, p. 598). This is the educated middle class, who live in separate neighbourhoods, work in places dominated by people from their own group, and are in possession of the same cultural capital as themselves. In other words, social inequality is reproduced along divisions of race and class (Anderson, 2007; Anderson, 2012). Stereotypes work when we make judgements on people based on prejudices about the identity of people who belong to certain groups. These prejudices reflect historical patterns of oppression and ideological rationalizations of inequality, and affect current relations between groups (Anderson, 2007, p. 605). Stereotypes also reinforce social segregation and cause discrimination towards disadvantaged groups, especially when they seek access to elite positions (Anderson, 2007, p. 605). The privileged will thus become more privileged while the disadvantages for the less privileged will increase (Anderson, 2007, pp. 601–602).

Anderson's main point is that an 'elite' drawn from a single sector suffers various cognitive deficits that make it unable to serve the interests of people from 'different walks of life' (Anderson, 2007, p. 607). To be able to serve the interests of all people requires that the members of the elite are able to communicate with others across different groups, and to think from the perspective of others (Anderson, 2007, p. 596). This is what Anderson defines as 'responsiveness', which requires four kinds of knowledge: 'awareness of the interests of others', 'disposition to serve those interests', 'technical knowledge of how to advance those interests', and 'competence in respectful interaction with people from all sectors' (Anderson, 2007, p. 596). Academic knowledge will only allow you to interpret and evaluate social situations from a neutral third-person perspective. What the elite need is knowledge of how structural injustice works based on personal experience and real communication across different sectors. According to Anderson, educational institutions value diversity, but without recognizing that this requires an expansion of the concept of knowledge itself (Anderson, 2007, p. 613).

Anderson claims that integration is the proper remedy against oppression caused by stereotypes and group-based prejudices. Integration implies that students from economic and racially segregated groups should be educated together. If every student is educated above the threshold of democratic equality, and educated together across race and class divisions, elite positions will be held by people from all sectors of society. The threshold is defined by making everyone ready for a four-year college degree. The claim is that integrated education, where different groups and social classes are educated together in stereotype-reducing settings, will foster inter-group communication and cooperation in terms of equality (Anderson, 2007, p. 616). Integrated education is not only a means for people to participate as equals in the public sphere of society, and be a part of the elite, but is

also necessary for democracy to work and develop. A society in which some people have privileged access to elite positions that give political power and control is not consistent with democracy.

Indigenous citizenship and the standard liberal approach³

Education for equal citizenship in the case of Indigenous citizenship is to some extent discussed within the science of education, especially by Indigenous scholars. The question of how to find a balance between diversity and unity is central within liberal egalitarian discussions of education, but questions concerning Indigenous citizenship are mostly overlooked. In spite of differences with regard to what equality consists of, most liberal theories share the assumption that democracy presumes that citizens share some common democratic values (Kymlicka, 1997, p. 20). These are values that have also been used to justify policies leading to the suppression and marginalization of Indigenous people. The question now is if the ideal of democratic equality is responsive to the ideal that education should promote equal citizenship for Indigenous people.

The advantage with the democratic equality approach is that it emphasizes structural dimensions of injustice, for instance how historical injustice, scientific racism, stereotypes and prejudices have created asymmetrical social and political power relations between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people. This implies that citizenship education should have a transformative component aimed at making the political dimension of Indigenous citizenship visible.

Anderson also suggests that integration is the means of working against stereotypes and prejudices that have a direct effect of discrimination against particular groups. I question this approach from two perspectives, first from the perspective of how democratic citizenship is conceptualized in traditional political liberal thought, and second from the perspective of what integration is supposed to do.

Anderson does not offer an accurate definition of either citizenship or democratic equality. Since the approach is primarily developed as an alternative to distributive luck egalitarianism, not as a theory of democracy or citizenship, this critique is not substantial. However, in my reading, the democratic equality approach reflects standard liberal notions of citizenship, where citizenship is defined in terms of democratic participation within the framework of accepted common rules for public reason. The citizens in Anderson's theory are regarded as

3 See also Vitikainen's discussion of the liberal conception of citizenship in Chapter 5 of this volume.

equal when they 'accept the obligation to justify their actions by principles acceptable to the other' (Anderson, 1999, p. 313). This is in line with John Rawls' political liberalism. According to Rawls, people exercise their citizenship when they are justifying their claims to another with political values that are understandable and shareable for all co-citizens in their capacity to be free and equal (Rawls, 1993, p. 20). His concept of citizenship is developed to find a balance between the need for unity and the respect for differences. Citizens in plural democratic societies have the right to develop their own identity and conception of the good in accordance with their cultural, moral or religious beliefs, but they also need to accept some rules for how to act and argue as citizens. Rawls' theory is based on a relatively sharp distinction between the political and the non-political spheres of the society (Rawls, 1993). Citizenship is defined in virtue of the individual's membership in the political sphere, which consists of basic institutions that affect the lives of all members of society. The non-political sphere consists of cultural values, their view of what a good life consists of, religion, and moral beliefs. Citizens in Rawls' theory would understand that when they are arguing and acting as political citizens, they are supposed to justify their behaviour with reasons acceptable to others in their capacity as free and equal citizens.

According to Rawls (1999), education for democratic citizenship should include information on their constitutional and civic rights, and should prepare them to be 'fully' cooperating members of society. Public education should focus on the children's role as future citizens, and provide knowledge that allows them to understand public culture and to participate in its institutions (Rawls, 1999, p. 120). In Rawls' theory, the acceptance of common rules is not simply pragmatic. The citizens in Rawls' theory are morally attached to basic democratic values. The standard approach to liberal education in multicultural and plural societies is that education should promote shared values in a minimal sense, and loyalty to values that are constitutional for democracy. This is also emphasized in the Norwegian core curriculum, which states that the students are to be given the opportunity to develop their own cultural and language identity within a 'common reference framework' (Ministry of Education and Research, 2017). Anderson argues in line with Rawls, and most liberal egalitarian theories of citizenship education and educational justice, and emphasizes that the student should be able to maintain their cultural identity and attachment to their cultural communities, as well as participate in shared democratic processes.

The standard liberal view is that cultural barriers need to be broken down by teaching the virtue of public reasonableness, and children must learn to distance themselves from views that are taken for granted, and learn to see what kind of reasons are acceptable from the perspectives of people from other backgrounds

(Kymlicka, 1997, p. 15). As Kymlicka notes, while the aim of citizenship education in the past was to promote unreflective patriotism and strong national identity, educational theorists and policy makers today reject this model in favour of 'one that promotes a more active and reflective form of citizenship' (Kymlicka, 1997, p. 16). With this, political liberals avoid the language of shared identity in a strong sense, but they still emphasize the importance of shared political and moral beliefs, and a commitment to shared democratic constitutional principles such as tolerance, reciprocity and respect for individual rights (Williams, 2007).

I am aware that the democratic equality approach, due to the focus on structural injustice manifested in stereotypes and everyday interaction, does not rely on the same distinction between political and non-political identity as Rawls does. My discussion is, however, restricted to how citizenship is usually conceptualized within the liberal egalitarian tradition.

Critics of the liberal conception of citizenship, such as Iris M. Young (1997), defend differentiated citizenship because the identity people are supposed to share is defined and implemented by groups with power. Groups with power tend to equate their own interests with public interests (Bank, 2008, p. 4). This is precisely what Anderson aims to change, by expanding the elite and the area of knowledge people who hold elite positions need to possess. Democratic equality requires absence of oppressive relationships, and effective access to the resources, skills, knowledge and space needed to interact as equals with other people (Anderson, 2004). Democratic equality for Indigenous people requires a concept of citizenship that is more transformative than the traditional liberal one, and citizenship education that has a more dual and multiple function.

Democratic equality and shared fate

As Annamari Vitikainen notes, from an Indigenous perspective, traditional Western liberal concepts of citizenship are problematic for a number of reasons. Indigenous people have not always been included in the state that wants to include them, and Indigenous peoples' own conception of citizenship or membership is often different from the liberal Western one (Vitikainen, 2021, p. 2). Democratic equality in the case of Indigenous citizenship should answer the challenging question of how historical injustice and feelings of alienation affect the way citizenship should be conceptualized (Woons, 2014, p. 193).

Melissa Williams suggests 'citizenship as shared fate' as an alternative to traditional liberal conceptions. She argues that even though liberals such as Rawls avoid talking about shared identity in a strong sense, they still emphasize the importance of shared moral beliefs and commitment to fundamental democratic values.

Shared fate is a forward-looking, pragmatic approach, developed in response to the fact that members of pluralistic societies do not necessarily share identity or loyalty to only one state or community, but that we still exist in social relations that depend on others and share political institutions (Vitikainen, 2021). As Williams notes, we are bound together because historical circumstances have thrown us together. We depend on each other whether we have chosen to or not, because what we do within these relations and institutional settings affects the lives of others (Williams, 2007, p. 229).

The shared fate approach and the democratic equality approach share the aim of promoting citizenship as a status marked by the absence of oppressive relationships. Williams agrees with democratic liberals that ‘an important function of education in democratic societies is to equip individuals with the capacities for meaningful and effective citizenship’ (Williams, 2007, p. 235). As with the democratic equality approach, citizenship education should aim toward developing peoples’ ‘enlarged thought’, which implies listening to voices, even when they are absent, and imagining how things look from the perspectives of others (Williams, 2007, pp. 231–232).

The question now is whether integration is the key to developing enlarged thought and sense of equality? From the perspective of Indigenous citizenship, the term integration does not necessarily come with positive connotations. Anderson is right in her claim that members of already privileged groups have better access to elite positions in democratic societies, and that those positions should be held by members from all sectors. However, historical structural injustice is not only rooted in group-based stereotypes, it is not only a matter of identity, but it is also manifested in the very structure of the institutions the democratic elite is supposed to work within.

Institutions are not culturally neutral, but are constituted by language and values that have been to the advantage of already privileged groups. In most democratic societies, the basic structure and its main institutions is for the privileged majority in the society. To ask people from historically oppressed groups to join established institutions, without awareness of how these institutions are constituted, may imply asking them to manage a stock of cultural capital that has been used to oppress them. As Martin Nakata notes, education that is designed to accommodate diversity and Indigenous perspectives occurs within the conceptualized framework that fits with Western ways of understanding terms such as ‘difference’ and ‘membership’ (Nakata, 2002). He also claims that when Indigenous perspectives are introduced in the classrooms, it is based on a duality between scientific knowledge and traditional knowledge. This not only obscures the complexity and intersection of the fields, but it also continues to present Indigenous

people as the Other by reusing the same categories that had been used to oppress them (Nakata, 2002, p. 28). Similar worries are expressed by Taiaiake Alfred and Jeff Corntassel (2002), who argue that the very discourse on Indigenous rights and political agency is infused by state-imposed conceptions that were historically used to control them.

Integration, without taking note of how historical injustice is reflected in the very structure of the basic institutions, is not sufficient to educate for democratic equality for Indigenous people. Citizenship that doesn't take into account the fact that Indigenous people are connected to their own 'people', territory and language is likely to undermine democratic equality rather than promote it.

Citizenship as shared fate aims to be responsive to the fact that members of the modern plural have dual and multiple citizenship. As noted by Annamari Vitikainen (2021), it is also responsive to the situation that relations are often power laden, and that Indigenous and non-Indigenous people may have different and conflicting views of history and national narratives. Williams' approach is based on the claim that the inability to define citizenship in shared values, loyalty and identity implies that Indigenous people can use multiple political channels, not only shared political institutions, but also separate political institutions (Woons, 2014, p. 197). Given the fact that people have suffered from different kinds of historical injustice, they do not need to interpret the relations and institutions they are sharing in the same way. Democratic participation should take social standing into account, and allow for contested conceptions of national history and national symbols, as well as the content and extent of 'public reason' (Ben-Porath, 2013, p. 383; Williams, 2007, p. 233).

Shared fate and education for democratic equality

The shared fate approach can be utilized in order to develop an account of education for democratic equality that considers how historical injustice still affects current power relations between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people. According to Williams (2007), education for citizenship stresses three dimensions of human agency: the capacity for enlarged thought; the imaginative capacity to see oneself as bound up with others through relations of interdependence as well as through shared history and institutions; and the capacity to reshape practices and institutions that shape one's environment through direct participation (p. 237). Integration is important to ensure equality, and encourages the capacity for enlarged thinking, but according to Williams (2007), students should first be taught the history and tradition of their local community. Williams (2007) suggests an approach to education that would lead to different curricula for different

regions, but she emphasizes that ‘local diversity is ultimately to enable students to see themselves as having political agency in the broader community’ (p. 241). I think Williams is right in assuming that local diversity will improve the political agency of marginalized groups, and it will also make them more able to use their own perspective, in order to change the institutional frameworks that are used to oppress them. The Norwegian parallel curriculum system can be seen as an instrument that aims to strengthen the ability to use one’s agency, to reframe and reconstruct codes of political institutions.

CONCLUSION: EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRATIC EQUALITY AND EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY

As introduced in first part of this chapter, one of the central debates within liberal egalitarian theories of education is the question of whether justice should be understood in terms of equality of adequacy. This is not simply a theoretical and abstract debate of how to understand equality and justice. As many scholars have noted, there is a movement, both in theory and policy, toward adequacy as an ideal for educational justice (Anderson, 2007; Satz, 2007). Advocates of the adequacy approach have tried to make the state responsible, to ensure that all students are educated to a threshold that enables them to function as equals in the society without being subject to oppression and exclusion (Anderson, 2007). The value of democracy is strongly emphasized in the Norwegian core curriculum. In this chapter, the debate on how to understand equality is brought into dialogue with the debate on how liberal education should accommodate for differences within the framework of shared democratic values. In this debate, the question of Indigenous citizenship and dual citizenship has received relatively little attention. The equality of opportunity approach has been criticized for being blind to differences, and for focusing too narrowly on the distribution of socioeconomic differences (Anderson, 1999; Fraser, 2003; Young, 1997). Due to how this approach has been used to justify assimilation and mainstreaming, this is also, to some extent, correct. However, as pointed out in the first part of the chapter, by focusing on involuntary unfavourable conditions, the equality of opportunity approach can also be used to argue for cultural justice. It is also important to note that democratic equality in fact requires a redistribution aimed at reducing gaps in welfare. Democratic equality, as Anderson describes, it is not compatible with substantial material inequalities (Gheaus, 2016).

The Norwegian core curriculum states that the school must give all pupils equal opportunities to learn and develop, regardless of their background and aptitudes’

(Ministry of Education and Research, 2017, p. 19). From the perspective of equality of opportunity, this implies that the state should distribute resources in order to reduce the impact that different cultural socioeconomic backgrounds often have on students' educational achievements. In a Norwegian context it can, for instance, justify the right for Sámi students to be taught in their own language. From a relational adequacy approach, this requires teaching practices and policies that promote solidarity and equality, and that give students the opportunity to express and develop different levels and dimensions of their citizenship.

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