| Tittel: | Breaking the mishap chain : Human factors lessons learned from aerospace accidents and incidents in research, flight test, and development | | Ansvar: | Peter W. Merlin, Gregg A. Bendrick, Dwight A. Holland | | Forfatter: | Merlin, Peter W.  / Bendrick, Gregg A. / Holland, Dwight A. | | Materialtype: | Bok | | Signatur: | Digital PDF | | Utgitt: | Washington, D.C. : National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2012 | | Omfang: | xv, 227 p. - ill. ; 25 cm. | | ISBN/ISSN: | 9780160904141 | | Klassenummer: | 363.12/414 | | Serie: | NASA Aeronautics Book Series | | Emneord: | Aeronautics - Research. Case studies / Aircraft accidents - Human factors. Case studies / Flight testing. Case studies / Flyhistorie / Flytyper / Luftfart / NASA / Research aircraft - Accidents. Case studies / Research aircraft - Design and construction. Case studies / Romfart / Space vehicle accidents. Case studies / Space vehicles - Design and construction. Case studies | | Geografiske emneord: | USA | | Note: | "NASA SP-2011-594"--T.p. verso.
Boken ligger kun som nedlastbar PDF på høyre side. | | Innhold: | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This volume contains a collection of case studies of mishaps involving experimental aircraft, aerospace vehicles, and spacecraft in which human factors played a significant role. In all cases the engineers involved, the leaders and managers, and the operators (i.e., pilots and astronauts) were supremely qualified and by all accounts superior performers. Such accidents and incidents rarely resulted from a single cause but were the outcome of a chain of events in which altering at least one element might have prevented disaster. As such, this work is most certainly not an anthology of blame. It is offered as a learning tool so that future organizations, programs, and projects may not be destined to repeat the mistakes of the past. These lessons were learned at high material and personal costs and should not be lost to the pages of history.
Part 1. Design Factors -- "It May Not Be Hooked Up" : Automation Bias, Poor Communication, and Crew Resource Management Factors in the X-31Mishap -- Habit Pattern Transfer During the M2-F2 First Flight -- Pilot-Induced Oscillation During Space Shuttle Approach and Landing Tests -- Part 2. Physiological Factors -- Screening Versus Design : The X-15 Reentry Mishap -- Six Million Dollar Man : M2-F2 Task Saturation Mishap -- Almost-Loss of Consciousness in the F-22A Raptor -- Part 3. Organizational Factors -- Decision Chain Leading to the XB-70/F-104 Midair Collision -- Mission Management and Cockpit Resource Management in the B-1A Mishap -- Collision in Space : Human Factors in the Mir-Progress Mishap -- Conclusions.
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